

HAZELTON, PA.
STANDARD-SPEAKER

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JUL 31 1972

Breaking Opponents' Codes

One of the sensational early domestic incidents of World War II was the revelation by the Chicago Tribune that the United States had broken the code of the Japanese empire. It led to Japan's revising its codes and consequent delays in our intercepting vital information at our listening posts. Officials regarded the disclosure as disloyal for these reasons.

This incident was recalled by the report in the New York Times of an article in the August issue of the radical Ramparts magazine, published by Noah's Ark, Inc., Berkeley, California. A former Air Force sergeant, who was discharged from the service in 1969, claimed that the United States has refined its electronic intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet or plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

The Times discovered the identity of the analyst, who signed his article with the pseudonym of Winslow Peck. Interviewing Peck, The Times corroborated many of his revelations, but found some experts strongly denying that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

This whole matter strikes at the funda-

mental security of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. In the sixties, the U-2 intelligence flights were known to the Soviet but Premier Khrushchev used it as an excuse to call off his summit talks with President Eisenhower. Government intelligence experts now say there has been no authorized violation of Soviet or Chinese space since.

Peck was employed by the little known National Security Agency. Headquartered at Fort Meade, near Baltimore, it has about 90,000 employees, mostly military. Its annual budget is about \$1 billion. Primarily, it collects world information, mostly through advanced technology, for distribution throughout the Government, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Peck claims that it has encircled the Communist world with some 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

It is reassuring to know how widespread is our intelligence apparatus. But, no matter how comforting, it is not information to broadcast to our foes. Its value is in its secrecy. Its revelation can only be distressing to American relations with the Communist powers with whom we are trying to set up new relations of co-existence leading to peace, and jeopardize the security of the nation, our homes and families.

STATINTL

A lack of intelligence

By Donald R. Morris
Post News Analyst

The August issue of Ramparts magazine — a periodical much given to attacks on the intelligence community — features an article entitled "U.S. Espionage: A Memoir," attributed to "Winslow Peck."

The article claims that the National Security Agency (NSA) has broken every Soviet code, and can pinpoint the location and type of each Soviet jet and missile submarine. It also claims the United States is still making routine U-2-type surveillance flights over the Soviet Union and China.

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"Peck" also claims that the electronic surveillance ship Liberty, on which 74 crewmen died in an Israeli attack during the Six-Day War in 1967, overheard Gen. Moshe Dayan order his troops on to Cairo and Damascus, as a result of which then President Lyndon B. Johnson brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movements, and on Premier Kosygin to call off a threatened Soviet airborne operation against Israel.

"Peck" turns out to be one Perry Fellwock, who enlisted in the Air Force in 1936 at the age of 20, was assigned to NSA for duty, served in NSA stations in Turkey and Indochina, and was discharged in November, 1959 — age 23, Ramparts claims he was a "senior analyst" with NSA.

Fellwock claims he then turned down a \$10,000-a-year job with the CIA, because he wanted to "work to end the Vietnam war." In April, 1972, he was arrested and fined \$50 for disturbing the peace in San Diego before the Republican party headquarters and the 11th Naval District headquarters.

In an interview with the New York Times, Fellwock said, "I know the FBI knows who I am. I'd like to avoid publicity but I'm willing to go through trial, and if I have to, to jail."

Fellwock and the Ramparts editorial board can sleep quietly. Neither the FBI nor anyone else is liable to bother him. NSA's "no comment" to the story does not conceal official agitation but only yawning boredom.

To begin with, while NSA does employ multitudes of Air Force enlisted men in a variety of clerical and technical capacities, it does not use such youthful detailees with high school educations as "analysts," senior or otherwise.

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There have been no U-2-type overflights since the early 60s, when the satellite reconnaissance programs were developed. The unmanned SAMOS capsule houses equipment so sophisticated that the photographic and electronic take is infinitely superior to that which a conventional overflight could produce. (The United States does send planes and ships to patrol the borders of the Soviet Union and China.)

AUG 1972

STATINTL

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies—it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATINTL

Troubled Former Security Technician Spills a Few U.S. Secrets

STATINTL

Conscience Forced Him to Break Oath, Ex-Sergeant Says In Magazine Interview

By John Peterson
FROM BERKELEY, CALIF.

Perry Fellwock is a shy, sensitive, troubled 26-year-old from Joplin, Mo. When he submitted to the magazine interview, he thought it should appear under another name—Winslow Peck—a name he had frequently used in his antiwar activities. "I wanted to protect friends and relatives, whom I care for very much. . . . I did not want them to become victims of the publicity I knew my actions would inevitably invite." But Perry Fellwock's cover didn't last long.

It was stripped away by the furor that followed last week's Ramparts magazine question-and-answer interview with the former intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Department's secret electronic-spying organization. The interview lifted the curtain a bit from the NSA's secret operations. Of the former sergeant's decision to tell some of what he knows about NSA's operations, he says, "It has been months of agonizing for me."

'America's Aggression'

Fellwock contends that the NSA has broken the diplomatic and military codes of all major foreign powers, and he charges that his disclosures, like those of the Pentagon Papers, reveal that the United States has deceived the public. Says Fellwock:

"The American military has used the myth of foreign aggression—the so-called 'missile gaps' and other phrases such as the Cold War—to get funds, armaments, and bodies for what is in reality America's aggression towards the people of other lands."

The Ramparts interview also contains some startling accounts: that the NSA's electronic eavesdropping allowed the United States to keep the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War from becoming a full-blown conflict involving the great powers, and that the U.S. listened in while a tearful Russian Premier Aleksei Kosygin bid farewell to a cosmonaut who was facing death after his space craft's braking parachutes failed.

Officials in Washington publicly declined comment on the article but privately denied that the United States had broken the most sophisticated codes of the foreign powers and that the NSA was

missiles, and ships at any time. Intelligence-establishment authorities, however, privately conceded that Fellwock's description of NSA's efforts was accurate. The Pentagon confirmed that he had been stationed in Turkey, Europe, and Southeast Asia during the three years he served as an analyst for the NSA. He was released from active duty on Oct. 29, 1969.

Arrest Revealed

Fellwock revealed his identity last week after a reporter learned that he had been arrested in San Diego during an antiwar demonstration and that the district attorney there knew Fellwock and Peck were the same man. He's short, bespectacled, reserved, and doesn't seem geared toward taking on the secret NSA, a huge organization headquartered at Ft. Meade, Md., between Baltimore and Washington, D.C. It employs about 100,000 persons and spends nearly \$1 billion annually.

At a press conference at the Ramparts office here, Fellwock said that "after the magazine was published I just wanted to become a private person again. But reporters were camping on my doorstep, and I didn't want people to think Winslow Peck was hiding. It has been the most unnerving experience I've ever been through."

In the Ramparts article Fellwock told why he decided to break the oath that he took when he left NSA; like other NSA employees, he pledged he would not divulge any classified information. "I loved my work at first. It was very exciting—traveling in Europe, the Middle East, Africa; knowing all the secrets. It was my whole life. . . . But then I went to [Viet] Nam, and it wasn't a big game we were playing with the Soviets anymore. It was killing people. My last three months in Nam were very traumatic. I couldn't go on, but I wasn't able to just quit. . . . So I faked it. . . . In a way, the war destroyed me."

'I'm Two People'

"I haven't digested it all; even though I've been out almost three years now, I still feel as though I'm two people—the one who did all the things I've laid out and another, different person who can't quite understand why. But even being against the war, it's taken a long time for me to want to say these things. I couldn't have done it nine months ago, not even three months ago. Daniel Ellsberg's releasing the Pentagon Papers made me want to talk. It's a burden; in a way I just want to get rid of it. I don't want to get sentimental or corny about it, but I've made some friends who love the Indochinese people. This is my way of loving them too."

as a fearless, muckraking magazine prompted him to consult the editors. "We spent a month and a half worrying about

the implications of the article," says Peter Collier, one of the top half-dozen editors. "We talked at great length with Nesson and Boudin (Charles Nesson and Leonard Boudin, the Ellsberg case defense lawyers) in Los Angeles. It is the kind of article we feel obligated to publish and we are proud of it, sure of its authenticity. We'd like it to prompt a congressional investigation into the NSA. We had hoped to publish just when Mr. Nixon was in Russia, but we couldn't get it checked out in time."

Collier concedes that Ramparts needed the exposure now. "We've had a short but glorious history, and we had gotten a little off the track in the late 1960s—this puts us back where we want to be," he says. The magazine had been a Catholic quarterly until 1963 when Warren Minckle became editor. By 1965 it was a monthly muckraker. In 1967 it ran articles exposing the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) infiltration of domestic and international student organizations.

Death of a Cosmonaut

In Ramparts' latest effort, Fellwock provides gripping details of events he says he observed or learned of while working as an analyst with NSA. For example, says Fellwock:

"We knew everything that went on in their [Soviet] Cosmos program. For instance, before I had gotten to Turkey, one of their rockets had exploded on the launching pad and two of their cosmonauts were killed. One died while I was there too. It was Soyuz 1, I believe. He [cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov] developed re-entry problems on his way back from orbit. They couldn't get the chute that slowed his craft down in re-entry to work. They knew what the problem was for about two hours before he died and were fighting to correct it. It was all in Russian, of course, but we taped it and listened to it a couple of times afterward. Kosygin called him personally. They had a video-phone conversation. Kosygin was crying. He told him he was a hero and that he had made the greatest achievement in Russian history, that they were proud and he'd be remembered. The guy's wife got on too. They talked for awhile. He told her how to handle their affairs, and what to do with the kids. It was pretty awful. Towards the last few minutes he began falling apart, saying, 'I don't want to die, you've got to do something.' Then there was just a scream as he died. . . ."

continued

29 JUL 1972

JENKIN LLOYD JONES

Spying Is Fun, Spoiling Is Serious

A sensational article to the effect that the U.S. National Security Agency has cracked all the Russian codes and therefore is immune from surprise has appeared in the left-wing magazine, *Ramparts*. It was anonymously written by a man who later identified himself as Perey Fellwock, 26, an anti-Vietnam war activist and former NSA communications analyst.

Fellwock described the Soviet Union as an "inferior power" and said the U.S. military was "the most dangerous threat to world peace."

If the article is true, many readers will conclude that we can relax about the Russians. Can we?

It would be helpful, of course, to know a month in advance that Moscow is preparing a conventional armament blitz, but if we lack counterweapons, which require a lead time of years, we'd merely be in the position of the man falling out of an airplane who is alert to the danger but doesn't have a parachute.

In David Kahn's 1967 book, *"The Code Breakers,"* which is probably the finest encyclopedia of cryptography ever written, the point is repeatedly made that code-breaking is essentially a business of exploring possibilities in an effort to catch a faint whiff of sense, and the more complicated the code, the larger the possibilities.

In the past, codes and ciphers were cracked by the sheer intellectual power of rare geniuses, but the computer has now arrived. The computer can immensely speed the survey of possibilities. So perhaps NSA has, indeed, cracked all the Russian codes, and perhaps Russian intelligence possesses all of ours.

America has come a long way from its age of innocence

in 1929 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson withdrew his support from the Black Chamber on the grounds that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

We are up to our eyeballs in trying to read everyone's mail, friend or potential foe and for two very pragmatic reasons:

Every first-rate intelligence service in the world is trying to do the same, and the chances of making major strategic and diplomatic miscalculations are diminished in direct proportion to one's knowledge of what other governments are doing and thinking.

People have a morbid fascination with spying, which the craft does not deserve. Cloak-and-dagger stuff is of small importance compared to the wise analysis of overt information. The bug is less powerful than the clipping scissors.

But spoiling can be more powerful than them all, if spoiling is defined as the technique of making it impossible for an opponent nation to defend itself.

Spoiling includes psychological warfare, designed to mislead and confuse a potential enemy. It pumps up divisions within the victim country to produce irreconcilable splits and paralysis of will. The technique may be used to scare people out of their wits, or, conversely, it may be used to assure them that the enemy is weak and vulnerable and not to be feared.

Beyond this, there are the carefully nurtured cadres for subversion, usually planted in organizations that are "soft" but not subversive. These are designed to operate over a long term: with the purpose of turning these organizations into fronts.

Beyond them are the saboteurs, usually called into action only when the crisis

approaches. Most dangerous of all is the "man-in-place," one who has apparent subversive connections and may have spent years worming his way into a position of high trust and influence.

Ladislas Farago's new book, *"The Game of the Foxes,"* concerns itself with German espionage and subversion before and during World War II. But it carries a lesson for our times.

Almost no one in America was sympathetic with the Nazis. Aside from a sprinkling of strutting Bundists and small gaggles of anti-Semites there was not much to build on. Yet Farago's case histories of German agents who were trusted in high government and even military circles and who succeeded in feeding subtle propaganda to the press are fascinating—and sobering.

The Communists, in contrast, have much to build on in America. And the aim is the obliteration of the American counterforce to the hoped-for "world revolution."

The propaganda line is not complicated. The victim government is corrupt and repressive. Armaments are a waste. The Communist "threat" is scare stuff. Money for defense is better spent in the pursuit of social justice. Capitalism breeds wars. Collectivism is just and irresistible.

There is no cause for panic or witch hunts or the untenable assertion that anyone who echoes any part of this line has traitorous motives. But it is dangerous to assume that one's enemy is stupid. And if the Communist hierarchy weren't seizing every opportunity to exacerbate division, disorder and the spirit of surrender in America it would be foolish, indeed.

Spying is fun. Everybody does it. But spoiling a nation's ability to survive is a deadly earnest business.

26 JULY 1972

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STATINTL

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There have been no U-2-type overflights since the early 60s, when the satellite reconnaissance programs were developed. The unmanned SAMOS capsule houses equipment so sophisticated that the photographic and electronic take is infinitely superior to that which a conventional overflight could produce. (The United States does send planes and ships along Soviet and Chinese borders to sniff out electronic developments and defensive techniques and reaction times, but these do not deliberately violate foreign air or sea space. When it happens by accident, the results can be disastrous.)

And youthful military enlisted men on detail to NSA simply do not have access to intelligence slated for the executive level — and they certainly aren't conversant with presidential actions based on such intelligence.

In short, Ramparts — which has scored palpable hits in the past — is attacking with an empty water pistol. And Fellwock, having secured ample amounts of the publicity he is so ardently avoiding, can sink back into the obscurity from which he emerged.

BRIDGEPORT, CONN.

TELEGRAM

JUL 24 1972

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Code Breaking

A former Air Force sergeant, who was discharged from the service in 1969, claims that the United States has refined its electronic intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet or plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

The press quickly discovered the identity of the analyst, who signed his article with the pseudonym of Winslow Peck. Peck corroborated many of his revelations, but found some experts strongly denying that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

This whole matter strikes at the fundamental security of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. In the sixties, the U-2 intelligence flights were known to the Soviet but Premier Khrushchev used it as an excuse to call off his summit talks with President Eisenhower. Government intelligence

experts now say there has been no authorized violation of Soviet or Chinese air space since.

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An outrage

An article in the August issue of Ramparts magazine describing a U.S. intelligence network that has purportedly broken all the Soviet military codes is the kind of reporting that must outrage responsible journalists.

At issue is not the credibility of the article, but the harmful impact it could have on both national security and our relations with other countries, particularly at this delicate juncture in international affairs.

Conscientious newsmen can take small comfort from the fact that American journalism offers relatively few such glaring examples of irresponsibility involving the national interest. One that comes readily to mind is the Chicago Tribune story during World War II revealing the breaking of the Japanese code. Fortunately, the Japanese didn't read the Tribune.

The Ramparts article is based on what the magazine says was an interview with a former Air Force sergeant assigned to the National Security Agency as an analyst. The source, identified by the pseudonym of Winslow Peck, 26, alleges that U.S. intelligence knows the location of all Russian jet aircraft, spacecraft and missile submarines; that the U.S. has routinely conducted aerial surveillance of the Soviet Union; monitors communications between all governments; and taps transatlantic telephone calls, both official and private, to and from this country.

That seems like an incredible amount of top-secret information to be entrusted to an Air Force sergeant—even one in intelligence. But be that as it may, even if U.S. intelligence actually has such highly detailed data about the Soviet military apparatus, the national interest would certainly not be served by broadcasting the fact.

Publication of the article is indefensible on this score alone, not to mention the difficulties it could cause U.S. relations with other countries, including our allies. All this when we are striving, with some success, to ease world tensions.

Above all else, a free press must be a responsible press—responsible not only to the people's right to know but to the collective vital interests of the society it serves.

19 JUL 1972

EXPERT ON CODES EXPLAINS HIS AIM

Hopes Magazine Article Will
Bar 'More Vietnams'

BERKELEY, Calif., July 18 (AP) — A 26-year-old antiwar activist credited by Ramparts Magazine as the source for an article on National Security Agency intelligence-gathering said today that he had spoken out to "make sure there are no more Vietnams."

Perry Fellwock of San Diego, identified in the article as Winslow Peck, appeared at a news conference with two editors of the magazine, Peter Collier and David Horowitz.

Mr. Fellwock read from a statement but refused to answer questions.

"My experience with the United States Government and its global mission has convinced me that the most dangerous threat to me, my family and to world peace itself, is the American military," he said.

"My experiences convinced me that even nations like the Soviet Union were not the danger I had always been led to believe they were," he said.

Cites People's 'Need to Know'

Mr. Fellwock asserted that to bring security and peace to

America, "We must take steps to insure there are no more Vietnams. I believe I have taken such a step. I have done it for neither money nor glory, but to bring to the American people knowledge which they have a "need to know."

The article said the agency, which has its headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., could crack all Soviet codes and enable the United States to pinpoint locations of Soviet military and space craft. The article appeared in the August issue of the liberal magazine, which went on sale yesterday.

[A dispatch from Washington Sunday in The New York Times on the Ramparts article reported that intelligence sources both in and out of the Government had corroborated much of Mr. Fellwock's story. The sources, strongly denied, however, that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or other major powers.]

Mr. Peck was described as a former communications analyst who worked for the agency in Istanbul and in Indochina before leaving because of disillusionment.

"We documented the article with sources available to us who were cognizant of the situation and were able to check out a large part of the story," Mr. Horowitz said.

But Mr. Collier said that Ramparts had "nothing on paper" to substantiate the claims.



Associated Press

Perry Fellwock, who identified himself yesterday as the man who wrote the Ramparts article. It said the U.S. had broken all Soviet codes.

ALL NATIONS REPORTED MONITORED

U.S. Espionage Role Detailed

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) — Government officials have declined comment on a Ramparts magazine article which says U.S. intelligence can pinpoint the location of Soviet military and spacecraft and can break all the Soviet military codes.

A White House spokesman in San Clemente, Calif., the Department of Defense in Washington and a spokesman for the National Security Agency at Ft. Meade, Md., would not respond to the article, entitled "U.S. Espionage: A Memoir."

The article, appearing in Ramparts' August issue which went on newstands today, is based on an interview with a man purported to be a former NSA analyst.

The ex-analyst, identified by a spokesman for the magazine as "Winslow Peck," — a pseudonym — is quoted as saying high-flying jets routinely make flights over Russian territory to test Soviet reactions.

Others Deny Account

While the Defense Department refused comment, as is customary in intelligence matters, other knowledgeable sources denied that U.S. planes fly over Russia gathering intelligence data.

The sources said the United States has not relied on intelligence flights over Soviet and Communist Chinese territory since the early 1960s, because it has sent aloft reconnaissance satellites, which transmit pictures and monitor radio and other communications forms.

Contacted in San Diego at a telephone number supplied by Ramparts, a man who said he was "Peck," 26, refused to give his real name but said he

was assigned too NSA for 3 years after enlisting in the Air Force in 1966. He said he lives in Washington, D.C., but now is on vacation in California.

He said he was sergeant when he quit because he was disillusioned in Vietnam.

Monitoring Cited

The Ramparts article said the United States monitors every government in the world, including its allies, and listens in on all transatlantic telephone calls to or from this country, even those by private citizens.

The monitoring includes diplomatic communications of allies — including interception of British communications through monitoring conducted at U.S. bases in England, Peck said.

"As far as the Soviet Union is concerned we know the whereabouts at any given time of all its aircraft, exclusive of small private planes, and its naval forces, including its missile-firing submarines," the former analyst said in the article.

"The fact is that we're able to break every code they've got, understand every type of communications equipment and enciphering device they've got," he added.

The magazine said NSA, established in 1952, employs about 15,000 servicemen and civilians at its Ft. Meade headquarters and about 90,000 around the world. NSA's main mission is code cracking and communications intelligence.

In the article the former analyst said that 80 percent of all "viable U.S. intelligence" comes from NSA-monitored communications.

Some who were asked to

comment about the story said Peck seemed to claim far more knowledge than he could have gained in an enlisted capacity.

The New York Times reported that a veteran of 30 years' service in intelligence said of Peck:

"He's obviously familiar with the NSA — its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early 20s would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what NSA material is used or discarded by the President or more than just the fringes about CIA operations."

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers" and a leading authority on cryptanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet foreign ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the 1930's," Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Peck said in Ramparts that he briefed then-Vice President

Hubert H. Humphrey on the Soviet tactical air force in 1967 and once listened to a tearful conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and a Russian cosmonaut about to be killed during re-entry.

Ramparts, a liberal monthly journal which features investigative articles, employs about 60 persons and has its editorial offices in Berkeley, Calif.

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U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15—The United States is reported to have refined its electronics intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

"We're able to break every code they've got," a former analyst in the National Security Agency, one of the most secret of the Government's many intelligence agencies, is quoted as saying in the August issue of Ramparts magazine, which is published by Noah's

Ark, Inc., 2054 University Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.

The former analyst, whose name was not given in the article, was an Air Force staff sergeant who was discharged from military service in 1969 after three years of overseas duty as a communications traffic analyst for the agency in Turkey, West Germany and Indochina. He uses the pseudonym of Winslow Peck in the article.

Some Corroboration Found

Mr. Peck, who is 25 years old, was recently interviewed by a correspondent of The New York Times in California. Extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of the Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the cor-

roboration of many of his revelations. But experts strongly denied that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

The national security agency headquarters is at Fort Meade, near Baltimore. It has nearly 100,000 employees — most of them military personnel — and spends slightly less than \$1-billion a year. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the collection of information — most of it through advanced technology — but it rarely, if ever, tries to evaluate or analyze it.

the United States has encircled the Communist world with at least 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

United States electronically equipped aircraft, according to the article, are constantly penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries to provoke and record their radar and signal techniques to develop countermeasures against them.

This claim has been challenged here by independent Government intelligence experts, who said that there have been no authorized, as distinct from inadvertent, violation of Soviet or Chinese airspace by the United States since the U-2 flights of the early nineteen-sixties. The experts said that satellite photography has replaced aerial overflights, conceding, however, that United States electronic intelligence planes often fly along Communist borders to provoke reaction and collect signals.

In the California interview, which was recorded on tape, Mr. Peck described his early life in Joplin, Mo., his enlistment in the Air Force in 1966 when he was 20 years old, his subsequent recruitment by the security agent, his specialized training, his promotions and his three years of duty overseas. He was discharged in California in November, 1969, and says he turned down a \$10,000-a-year job offer by the Central Intelligence Agency. He decided instead, he says, to work to end the Vietnam war.

Tells of TV Monitoring

A highlight of Mr. Peck's disclosures include a report that in 1967 during his duty in Turkey the agency monitored a live Soviet television contact between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who was in tears bidding an emotional farewell to the astronauts Vladimir M. Komarov.

Mr. Komarov was then in orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz I, which was still two hours from re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. According to Mr. Peck's account the astronaut had just been informed by Soviet ground control that he was breaking parachutes designed to

bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and that there was no hope of saving him.

Soyuz 1 crashed on Soviet territory on April 25, 1967, and Mr. Komarov was killed. He was posthumously granted a second Order of Hero of the Soviet Union and is buried in the Kremlin walls.

Mr. Peck also said that during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States electronic intelligence ship, the Liberty, was ordered near the Israeli coast to intercept details of Israeli military intentions.

The ship was attacked on June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats—an incident that cost 34 United States dead and 75 wounded and which President Lyndon B. Johnson later described in his book, "The Vintage o'Pint," as a "heart-breaking episode." Before the attack, he said, the Liberty learned that General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister, intended to order his forces on to Damascus and Cairo.

Tells of Johnson Pressure

Mr. Peck stated that President Johnson then brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movement and warned Premier Kosygin on the "hot line" against what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne operation from bases in Bulgaria against Israel.

Intelligence sources here said they were unable to recall these details but a veteran of 30 years service in intelligence said of Mr. Peck:

"He's obviously familiar with N.S.A.—its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early twenties would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what N.S.A. material is used or discarded

by the President or more than just the fringes about C.I.A. operations."

During his year of duty in Vietnam, from November, 1968, to October, 1969, Mr. Peck, said, he participated in airborne electronic sweeps in Thailand in support of C.I.A. operations. The C.I.A., he said, was using unmarked attack bombers flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and based at Udorn to punish Meo tribesmen who had clashed with Thai Government troops over control of their traditional areas.

The United States depended on a friendly Thai Government for important air bases and other facilities useful for the Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted, and thus was prepared to assign the C.I.A. surreptitiously to suppress internal disorders.

Neither the N.S.A. nor the C.I.A. would comment today. Senior Government intelligence officials who were shown transcripts of the Peck interview discounted parts of it but corroborated others.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," (published by Macmillan in 1967) and a leading authority on cryptanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Mr. Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet Foreign Ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the nineteen thirties," Mr. Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Mr. Peck's contention that "information gathered by N.S.A. is complete" implies a false importance, Mr. Kahn said. The N.S.A. does, he said, "solve" many nations' diplomatic codes; but these are countries of the third rank and provide only "indirect clues to Communist intentions."

Mr. Kahn noted that "what we are doing in this field the Russians are doing and, contrary to the Ramparts statement, they are very good."

He pointed out finally that the " thrust of the article, that the N.S.A. threatens peace, is incorrect."

"I believe that in the existing world of two armed camps," Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can provide more light, more truth—and this can lead to better evaluation of situations and so to more realistic responses. N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A., which can foment revolutions and can indeed threaten peace."

The interview contains a lengthy question-and-answer passage that Mr. Peck conceded, in his interview with The Times, was hurriedly prepared at a time when he was "extremely rattled."

details of hitherto suspected but obscure details of electronic eavesdropping around the globe resulted, he said, from opposition to the Vietnam War and from a hope that others doing similar clandestine Government work would "come forward and say what they know." He concedes that the agency may involve him in legal tangles.

Continued

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16 AUG 1971
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Intelligence Units Face Revamping

The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations -- particularly those of the military -- with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have under study since early this year. Now however in addition to some internal Nixon administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least \$500 million out of the roughly \$5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of a corps of military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work that now numbers an estimated 200,000 people.

Ellender's chief target, sources close to the senator say, is not the highly specialized, civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, but the separate intelligence operations run by each of the military services and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Officials have estimated that about \$3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills is spent by the military. The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender's concern is known to involve overlap between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower ranking men, and the setting up of a global communications network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was a widespread feeling in the Executive Branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful intelligence produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed.

The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, CIA and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another involved movement of the CIA's highly esteemed director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

E - 702,637
S - 368,841

JUN 9 1971

A CIA

Post in

England?

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

LONDON — Searching questions about a huge "Radio-Communications" establishment built with American money at Orford Ness on the Suffolk Coast are being asked by Labor members of Parliament.

They suspect that it is really a giant station of U. S. intelligence. The government claims the station is being operated by the Royal Air Force for radio research, but the MPs believe that this is a cover story.

They are confident that it is being operated mainly by the U. S. National Security Agency, which specializes in electronic eavesdropping on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency and the U. S. Defense Dept.

The Orford Ness station — a complex of 189 radio masts on a 700 acre site — can cover the whole of Russia and all other Iron Curtain countries.

Missile Launchings

The extremely advanced equipment, which is American, is believed capable of detecting details about missile launchings, including experimental firings.

The station also is understood to be concerned with the interception of certain kinds of secret information passing between military installations behind the Iron Curtain.

So the MPs fear it is yet another possible target for Soviet attack on Britain.

British security authorities are doing all they can to prevent any disclosure being asked in Parliament.

And they are certain to be helped by former Prime Minister Wilson and other Labor leaders, for the deal under which the Orford Ness station was set up by the U. S. was made while Labor was in office four years ago. \$50 Million

The station is officially said to have cost over \$50 million. But the total cost, most of it footed by the U. S. government, is believed to be more than double this sum.

The MPs' suspicions were aroused by publicity organized by the Defense Ministry two weeks ago to allay local concern about the station. Fishermen were told that they might experience mild electric shocks when the station carries out full-scale "radio-communication experiments" in a few months' time.

LONDON EXPRESS

DEC 29 1970

M - 17,994

S - 28,710

How Deeply Is Military Involved In Spying?

Congressional investigation of the National Security Agency (NSA) is expected in the wake of mid-December disclosure that Army intelligence agents spied on more than 800 Illinois civilians ranging from federal, state and local officials to newspaper reporters, lawyers and church figures.

Included were two of the Prairie State's most highly-respected public officials, Otto Kerner, who served two terms as governor and now is a federal judge, and Adlai E. Stevenson III, who was a state legislator and then state treasurer before his November election as a U.S. senator.

Stevenson, son of the late United Nations ambassador, defeated Ralph Smith, for whom President Nixon went into Illinois to campaign personally. By appointment, Smith was filling the unexpired term of the late Everett Dirksen.

Both Kerner and Stevenson have enjoyed voting support of independent Republicans as well as members of their own party. Revelation that they were spied upon is creating a strong stir of reaction, despite Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor's denial that the Army spied on the former governor and the newly-elected senator.

Crystallizing is the question of how deeply the military is involved in domestic espionage — whether enough to threaten the privacy of individuals or enough to endanger civilian supremacy over the military.

* * *

IT IS AN OPEN SECRET that Army policy permits spying on civilians, but such spying is supposed to be limited to civilians with a penchant for violence or other illegal conduct.

U.S. Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-S.C., head of the Senate's constitutional rights subcommittee, has disputed this, asserting that surveillance — which he infers has been widespread and not confined merely to Illinois — has been directed to persons not actively supporting Vietnam or domestic policies of the Nixon administration.

White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler stated, in response to questioning about domestic spying by the military, "It will not be done under this administration. For the past 10 years, the military gave assurances for the present and future but did not cover the past.

Asked if the President had ordered such activities stopped, Ziegler replied, "For me to answer that would suggest that it is going on. I would refer you to what the secretary of defense has said — it is not going on in any way at this time."

Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced reorganization of military intelligence to strengthen civilian control and protect constitutional rights of individuals. Control of the vast Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be removed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and placed directly under Laird by Feb. 1.

* * *

INFORMATION ON SPYING in Illinois came from John M. O'Brien, former staff sergeant with the 113th Military Group, with jurisdiction over the Midwest.

O'Brien's disclosure was motivated by his "concern for constitutional protections guaranteed to all people in our country." He said he had decided to disclose his Army activities "to make unknowing people aware of the menace that exists."

In written allegation, O'Brien stated that his group switched from strictly military information-gathering in early 1968. After June, 1969, he wrote, "My entire effort . . . was directed against individuals and organizations not associated with any military service."

His own assignment was to monitor activities of anti-war groups, he said. He was not personally involved in spying on Kerner or Stevenson, but he saw files on them. Kerner and Stevenson are identified in Army records as members of the liberal wing of the Democratic party but O'Brien noted that right-wing Minutemen also were included in Army surveillance.

* * *

NSA IS A HUSH-HUSH agency with responsibility for code-making and code-breaking. The agency also furnishes expertise to the intelligence community on construction of sophisticated eavesdropping devices, from pocket microphones to instruments used aboard spy satellites.

NSA is bigger than CIA and spends more money than CIA does. Its budget, concealed in appropriations made for other departments and agencies, could be imperiled as a result of disclosure that military intelligence agents spied on U.S. civilians. Billions of dollars in contracts with the electronics industry cutback now being threatened by some congressmen.

With money as well as constitutional rights at stake, there may be fireworks if Congress begins probing into activities of the military's scientific spy shop.

Congress — perhaps even the taxpayers who foot the bill — may finally have the chance to look inside NSA and see what makes it tick — and for whom it ticks. It certainly should not tick for the personal benefit of politicians — Democratic or Republican!

STATINTL

Panorama Dialogue

Top Secret Stuff...

WE ALL KNOW that people who work for the CIA don't like to talk about it. Top secret stuff. Some of us also know that there is an agency that makes the CIA look like an afternoon bridge club. That is the NSA: the National Security Agency.

The other day the guest list at a reception included platoons of CIA people—and two NSA chaps, who spent most of their time sitting in a corner chuckling about all the secretive characters milling about.

Then somebody at the table got to talking about car pools. One NSA man said he didn't like car pools, but a co-worker was trying to talk him into joining one.

"Who's that?" the other NSA man asked.

The first wrinkled his forehead and stared into his drink for a moment.

"Gee," he finally said, "what is his name? Archie something...?"

B. F. HENRY of Alexandria is the valiant sort. He once walked seven miles to work when one of our little snowstorms stopped vehicles.

But his latest feat is even more steadfast. He bought a suit off a rack Saltz's had stashed away just for such as B. F.—and is walking around in it after his wife asked their son how he liked the suit and the son replied absently: "Oh yes, I guess they used to wear them like that all the time."

THE FAMILY was sitting peacefully one night recently and Mother, just getting to the morning paper, was reading a Dick Coe story about Robert Goulet and Carol Lawrence.

"Richard Coe says they are the Lunts of musical comedy," she observed.

Elder Son, no drama history buff, looked up puzzled.

"What's a lunt?" he asked.

GOING TO VOTE in Maryland Tuesday was a trying experience. The voters at my polling place had to run a gauntlet of campaign workers to get to the schoolhouse door. I suppose it was pretty much the same everywhere, and more of a distraction this year than I can remember coping with before.

The election law says last-minute campaigners must stay at least 100 feet from polling places, and a policeman was there to enforce it. But to get to the last 100 feet I had to pass legions of people who shouted and pushed pamphlets at me.

"You a Republican?" one demanded loudly, and next, "You a Democrat?" The demand to know my party affiliation so they could thrust "voting guides" on me was repeated continuously as I moved down the line.

To top it off, there were signs nearby offering lemonade and car washes for sale.

The whole crass show almost put me in a bad mood.

—HAL WILLARD

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The Federal Diary

NSA Cafe Caper Upsets Employees

By
Mike
Causey



Unlike most federal activities, the super-secret National Security Agency doesn't devote a lot of time or money to cranking out press releases.

Many people don't even know that NSA, which employs several thousand persons behind a big fence at Ft. Meade, Md., even exists. A lot of people think they know what the CIA is doing, but ask them about NSA and you will usually draw a blank. This is the way NSA would want it.

Anyhow, NSA does exist. And we can report that despite its hush-hush mission, it has its share of regular government gripes that often center on the parking and stomach areas. In this case some people feel, that NSA's own eating spot is sadly out of tune with the times.

Certain that this information won't give aid and comfort to the enemy, it is safe to report that hard-boiled eggs at the NSA eatery are going for 15 cents each, which egg-lovers there think is too much. They have protested the egg price and also the fact that sandwiches have gone up a nickel and potato chips have been dropped as a filler.

Workers are beefing because the restaurant and snack bars have been closed recently, leaving the captive audience with mid-morning and afternoon hunger pangs. (Getting in and out of NSA isn't the easiest thing in the world, especially if you only have 15 minutes for a break and the nearest coffee shop is in Odenton, Md.).

NSA people also have complained that too much emphasis is being placed on refurbishing the cafeteria and not enough on the basics such as food.

Those of us who don't work for NSA will probably never be able to break the agency's code and learn the outcome of the silent battle for the cafeteria. But it's nice to know that underneath all that mystery and glamour, NSA has its

Union is backing the bipartisan Senate bill that would establish a national health insurance plan. Most federal and postal unions operate their own plans, for the benefit of members and as an incentive to recruit new ones. Federal employees now pay out \$547 million a year in premiums, and the government \$299 million.

NPU President David Silvergleid said present plans "are hospital-oriented and therefore tend to drive up costs." He thinks a federally run plan would permit an extension of benefits without the drastic price increases that have hit health and hospitalization recently.

Aroma Patrol: The Bureau of Customs is building up an elite of German shepherd and Labrador dogs to help sniff out illegal drugs being smuggled across the borders. The armed forces have used dogs for years, finding them especially keen on marijuana and hashish.

But Customs isn't going entirely to the dogs. Congress is in the process of approving request for 970 new jobs, to be staffed by human agents. The Senate approved that amount, which is 170 more than agreed by the House.

The American Foreign Service Association plans its annual business meeting Sept. 23, in Room 1351 of the New State building. The noon session is open to all AFSA members.

James B. Sweeney, naval oceanographic office's information officer, has written a book called "A Pictorial History of Oceanographic Submersibles." It's put out by Crown Publishers of Long Island and costs \$9.95.

Jobs: National Capital Housing Authority needs a Grade 13 or 14 general engineer, GS 12 mechanical engineer and a GS 11 architect. Call 382-8025.

Health, Education and Welfare wants GS 5 through 11 COBOL programmers. Call Mr. Burton at 962-4609.

General Accounting Office has openings for clerk-typists, GS 3 and 4, and clerk-stenos, GS 4 and 5. Call 386-6161.

Herbert A. Doyle Jr. has been moved up to the key job as deputy director of Labor's Bureau of Employees' Compensation. Doyle and director John M. Ekeberg will handle the \$1.1-billion-dollar program for disabled and injured federal workers.

The Long Shadowy Hand Of America's CIA

STATINTL

Since every action of the United States Central Intelligence Agency is top secret it is hard to ferret out the facts, but over the years fragments emerge which throw some light on its activities.

Its budget is split among a 100 items in the United States' multi-billion dollar defence appropriations. Only two or three Senators and Congressmen, members of a watchdog committee, are privy to its size.

The CIA itself reports to another super-secret body, the National Defence Council, which for the record says virtually nothing. Even its membership is secret.

But it can be said that the CIA budget rivals that of many medium-sized nations, and it employs tens of thousands of agents throughout the world — probably more than Russia.

The CIA is quick to point out that it operates only outside the limits of the continental United States. Its work internally being done by the FBI. Each foreign post has a "Resident" who controls the activities of his men in the field. Often the Resident operates out of the United States Embassy in the nation concerned, much to the disgust of regular diplomats who call CIA men "spooks," sometimes to their faces.

Control

Controlling and co-ordinating these world-wide operations is a huge staff in CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia — a massive concrete building tucked away behind a grove of trees just off a super-highway a few miles from Washington, DC.

A coy direction sign announces it as the Public Works Department for the District of Columbia.

CIA critics say this piece of cloak-and-dagger nonsense which deceives nobody is typical of the theatrical amateurism of the entire CIA operation.

The CIA's most spectacular failure was, of course, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Despite its protestations at being only an external agency, CIA agents were active in Miami, Florida, recruiting Cuban refugees to fight.

The agency's advice to the Pentagon and White House on the degree of support Prime Minister Fidel Castro had in his own country proved competently erroneous. Many liberal Senators claim that the agency is so paranoid about Communists and Communism that its collective judgements are often seriously distorted.

Certainly the record indicates that the CIA is more likely to be friendly to right-wing politicians and military men than anybody else. They have been accused, often with convincing evidence, of interfering on the side of the generals in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, notably Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil.

Mainstay

The agency has been a mainstay of President Ky's military regime in South Vietnam, and there is no doubt that it had a big hand in toppling the neutralist

government of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Perhaps its most sickening intervention was in Greece, where the colonels oligarchy boasts of the support of the United States Government as it imprisons and tortures its democratic opponents.

The evidence indicates that the CIA uses all classic tools of a spy organisation — assassination, murder, bribery and blackmail of key officials, etc. Last year the CIA was reported to have Green Beret troops in Viet-

nam who were charged with the murder of a Vietnamese national, said to be a double agent.

Another agency, little-known outside of the United States that plays a key role in supporting CIA activity is the National Security Agency (NSA), not to be confused with NASA, the space agency.

Headquartered in a

Security

sprawling complex at Fort Meade, Maryland, some 30 miles from Langley, the NSA's security arrangements are, if possible, even tighter than those of the CIA. It bristles with Marine guards and anybody walking around the building without conspicuously displaying his identity will instantly have a

gun barrel at his head.

NSA's principal task is to crack the diplomatic and military codes of every other nation on earth. It employs some of the most sophisticated computer equipment ever assembled.

The results of this work are useful to the CIA and the National Security Council. But several allied governments have expressed annoyance over the exercise.

The growing criticism is making it more difficult for the CIA to recruit suitable personnel. It is said that they are more and more turning to men with a law

Almost without exception, military coups around the world in recent years have brought charges of involvement by America's Central Intelligence Agency. Recently King Hussein has hinted at CIA interference in Jordan. What is this shadowy organisation and how does it work? R. W. Cocking investigates for Gemini News Service

enforcement background, as opposed to the more free-wheeling Ivy League college graduates who used to make up the core of their key people.

One problem is that men resigning from the CIA often find that employment at Langley offers real obstacles to getting a new job.

A well-publicised case occurred in Washington recently when a CIA employee resigned to return to university teaching. He was on the short list for a plum appointment, but when it became known he had been a researcher for

the CIA his name was dropped from consideration.

Defenders of the agency argue that every major power must be in the intelligence business as a matter of self-protection.

On the charge of amateurism, one CIA man told me: "Sure we make a lot of mistakes. After all, the United States has been running the world for only a little more than 25 years. Before us, the British were doing it for nearly 300, which gave them plenty of time to learn how to run an intelligence network."

STATINTL

30 MAR 1970

LESS INTELLIGENCE

U.S. military intelligence operations will be curtailed by 10 per cent next year as part of the over-all defense budget reduction. Some operations—notably those of Pueblo-type spy ships—have been dropped already and others, such as flights of the EC-121 electronic intelligence plane and the SR-71 photoreconnaissance plane, have been cut back. And still further cuts in this kind of intelligence operation are planned: Defense Secretary Laird's management experts have discovered overlapping functions and inadequate coordination between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

'POTEMKIN' MISSILE SITES?

U.S. intelligence analysts believe that the Russians are building false missile sites to deceive American spy satellites. The U.S. credits the Soviets with 1,300 intercontinental ballistic missiles completed or under construction—but some of the holes dug for the latter may be phonies intended to mislead Strategic Air Command target planners and to create a false impression of Soviet superiority. The U.S. admits to having 1,054 ICBM's in operation.

SAIGON: U.S. HEADQUARTERS SHIFT?

The U.S. high command in South Vietnam is thinking of moving its headquarters from Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport to the large American Army base at Long Binh, 20 miles outside the city, or to Cam Ranh Bay, 50 miles distant. The aim is to lessen the impact of GI's on Saigon. It was suggested by Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute think tank.

STATINTL

Tonkin Bay: Was There a Conspiracy?

Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality by Joseph C. Goulden.

A James B. Adler Inc. Book, published in association with Rand McNally, 283 pp., \$6.95

Peter Dale Scott

Seaman Patrick N. Park, on the night of August 4, 1964, was directing the gun-control radar of the *USS Maddox*. For three hours he had heard torpedo reports from the ship's sonarman, and he had seen, two or three times, the flash of guns from a nearby destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, in the rainy darkness. But his radar could find no targets, "only the occasional roll of a wave as it breaks into a whitecap." At last, just before midnight, a target: "a damned big one, right on us... about 1,500 yards off the side, a nice fat blip." He was ordered to open fire; luckily, however, not all seamen blindly follow orders.

Just before I pushed the trigger I suddenly realized, That's the *Turner Joy*.... There was a lot of yelling of "Goddamn" back and forth, with the bridge telling me to "fire before we lose contact," and me yelling right back at them.... I finally told them, "I'm not opening fire until I know where the *Turner Joy* is." The bridge got on the phone and said, "Turn on your lights, *Turner Joy*." Sure enough, there she was, right in the cross hairs... 1,500 yards away. If I had fired, it would have blown it clean out of the water. In fact, I could have been shot for not squeezing the trigger. Then people started asking, "What are we shooting at...?" We all began calming down. The whole thing seemed to end then.

Goulden's fascinating book, which has gathered much new information about the Tonkin Gulf incidents, sees the experience of Patrick Park as, with one exception, a microcosm of the entire Tonkin affair—

illustrating the confusion between illusion and reality and the inclination of man to act upon facts as he anticipates they *should be*, rather than what rational examination shows them *to be*. The exception is that Park refused to squeeze the trigger. The *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* acted on the basis of assumption, not fact—hastily, pre-emptively, perhaps even unnecessarily.

sarily—firing at an unseen enemy lurking behind the blackness of misinformation.

Not all will accept the analogy between Washington and a confused young seaman, but this hardly lessens the importance of Goulden's patient researches. The author of a book on AT&T and a former reporter for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Goulden has made good use of his years of experience in Washington. He has not really written a "thesis" book; his method is to stick closely to official documents (above all the neglected Fulbright Committee hearing of 1968) and first-hand interviews with witnesses the Committee failed to call, including Seaman Park. At times he can be faulted for believing so much what was told him in the Pentagon. Even so, the

result is devastating. It is now even more clear that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (in his words) "contains the fatal taint of deception." The Administration had withheld much vital information in formulating the simple story of "unprovoked attack" by which that resolution was pushed through Congress.

The *Maddox*, according to McNamara in 1964, was on a "routine patrol in international waters." In fact it was on an electronics intelligence (ELINT) or spy mission for the National Security Agency and CIA. One of its many intelligence requirements orders was "to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnamese electronic reaction," i.e., to provoke the North Vietnamese into turning on their defensive radars so that the frequencies could be measured. To this end, between August 1 and 4, the *Maddox* repeatedly simulated attacks by moving toward the shore with its gun control radar mechanism turned on, as if it were preparing to shoot at targets. In so doing, it violated the twelve-mile limit which Pentagon officials thought North Vietnam claimed for her territorial waters.² Far from being "routine," this was only the third such patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in thirty-two months; and the North Vietnamese had to assess it in the context of a recent US build-up and South Vietnamese threats to carry the war north. On July 31, just before the patrol, the South Vietnamese had for the first

heard North Vietnamese orders to position a defensive ring of PT boats around Hon Me after the first South Vietnamese attack on the North Vietnamese islands, as well as speculations about the possible link between the *Maddox* and the raids.

Near Hon Me on the morning of August 2 the NSA technicians intercepted orders for PT boats to attack the *Maddox*. Captain Herrick, aboard the *Maddox* cabled to his superiors in Honolulu that "continuance of patrol presents an unacceptable risk," but was ordered to resume his itinerary. The *Maddox* returned to a point eleven miles from Hon Me island, and then heard a North Vietnamese order for its attack. This was the prelude for the first incident of August 2—it is clear both that a North Vietnamese attack was ordered and

According to *The New York Times* (Aug. 11, 1964, p. 15) the *Ticonderoga's* Task Force Commander Rear Admiral Robert B. Moore "indicated that the destroyer might have been two or three miles inside the 12-mile limit set by Hanoi for international waters."

McNamara told the Committee that the *Maddox* could simulate an attack on the coast by turning on special transmitters, but the Pentagon later said the ship carried passive equipment and could only listen.

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An Inside Look at Our Espionage Network

THE SUPER SPIES

Andrew Tully

(Morrow, 256 pp., \$5.95)

Reviewed by William A. Korns

A former newsman, Korns recently left the Senate after four years as a legislative assistant.

The Pueblo affair alerted many Americans for the first time to the existence of the National Security Agency, an arm of the Defense Department charged with penetrating the communications of other nations and protecting those of the United States. Now, in what his publishers have billed as "The Inside Story of NSA, America's Biggest, Most Secret, Most Powerful Spy Agency," Andrew Tully, former Scripps-Howard writer and veteran popularizer of "inside stories" ("White Tie and Dagger," "CIA: The Inside Story") sets out to satisfy the national appetite for exposés.

It should not trouble anyone that only one of Tully's 16 chapters deals directly with NSA. It tells a great deal more about the work of the agency than was known to most Americans, but probably less than is known to the Soviets, to whom two NSA cryptologists defected in 1960.

Some of the information is less than startling: The fact that NSA employees report for work in three shifts—at 7:20, 7:40 and 8 a.m.—reveals more about highway and parking-lot conditions than about codes and ciphers. On the other hand, Tully's assertion that NSA "probably spends twice as much" as the Central Intelligence Agency (which he credits with \$750 million)—while lacking the authority of an open-budget document—indicates the high cost of technological innovations in the field of global surveillance.

For the rest, Tully has assembled a potpourri of facts, anecdotes and purported case histories of the espionage activities of the several agencies that make up the American intelligence community, seasoned it with an ample fund of secret ingredients and served it up in a breezy yet credible fashion.

Whether all of the exploits he attributes to operatives of the Defense Intelligence

Agency) or INR (the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research) in fact occurred as related may be doubted by Washington insiders. But if Tully has embellished his account to any degree for lack of ability to check out every detail, there is no objective basis on which to question the main thrust of his book—that the taxpayer is supporting a very large, diversified and highly competitive intelligence apparatus (costing more than \$4 billion a year, Tully says) in the name of national security.

Advance information on the capabilities and intentions of a hostile power seems so patently desirable that one is not inclined to question the cost. Yet some of Tully's stories do raise the question, inferentially, by illustrating that the utility of intelligence rests on far more than its accuracy or timeliness. Thanks to an unsung CIA Agent in East Germany, says Tully, the U.S. acquired microfilms in May, 1968, showing "in amazing detail" the Soviet Union's plan to invade and occupy Czechoslovakia, and both U.S. and West German authorities recommended "leaking" the plan to mobilize world opinion against the Soviets.

"But Ambassador Lodge had orders from Washington," writes Tully, "and he turned thumbs down on the proposal. The war in Vietnam, said Lodge, had so complicated the international situation that the United States could not afford to engage in a brinkmanship contest with the Soviet Union. Should such information be leaked, he said, the United States would be forced to issue a strong statement, warning Russia to desist. Washington just

did not want to get into such a situation at this time, Lodge said."

It is somewhat disconcerting to learn from Tully that, in 1967, Soviet leaders were telling "neutral diplomats they could not believe either increased bombing or commitment of more U.S. troops could achieve a military victory, and thus there was nothing for the rest of the world to do but wait for the United States to stop the escalation of a 'senseless and dirty war'." Had that intelligence been given more weight, both the United States and Vietnam might have been better served.

It is, in fact, how intelligence is weighed that will most often determine its impact on policy. Rarely is there so much incontrovertible evidence in hand that only one conclusion can emerge, so elaborate procedures exist within the intelligence community for producing consensus on such prickly questions as Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the public has no assurance that the system is the best for the nation. As Lodge once correctly, "Congress has shielded

away from looking too deeply into the finances, activities and influence of the intelligence community on foreign policy, on the grounds it should not hamper or compromise" secret operations.

This, too, may change. This year's ABM debate brought home to many Senators the high costs of basing weapons policies on "worst possible" estimates of Soviet intentions. Sen. Symington's Foreign Relations subcommittee, now burrowing into U.S. base agreements around the world, is finding intelligence operations to be a large part of the picture.

But if a Congress grown leery of "national commitments" is likely to probe a bit more deeply into intelligence matters in the future, don't look for big savings. The same Congressmen who question our global military deployment look to arms control measures for enhanced security, and, if these are to be effective, they concede, we must have the means, unilaterally, to verify compliance with any and better intelligence.



CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 545,570
S - 712,175

OCT 30 1969

What's going on in Laos?

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, finds it "inconceivable" that the United States is waging a "clandestine war" in Laos without the Congress being informed.

We find it inconceivable the American public has not been informed.

Closed hearings on the U.S. involvement in Laos are now being held by a Senate subcommittee chaired by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.). Symington has said the United States has been "at war in Laos for years." Fulbright says the United States is spending at least \$150,000,000 a year in Laos to arm and train an army. It supports this force with "an enormous air force, I mean the U.S. Air Force operating out of Thailand," says Fulbright.

The Laos operation began in President Kennedy's administration. It is run, Fulbright says, by the CIA under the direction of the National Security Agency, the top U.S. intelligence agency. In Fulbright's opinion there is no constitutional authority for such activity and no treaty with Laos that provides for it.

The subcommittee hearings are being held behind closed doors for rea-

sons of national security. No one should quarrel with that. But the extent of U.S. involvement is not a matter of national security. We know how many troops North Vietnam has in Laos (45,000), how many troops Red China has (20,000) and the Communists undoubtedly know how many troops the United States has in Laos.

The American people have a right to know also. The agony of Vietnam, the longest war in U.S. history, has caused a deep schism in America. Is the United States beginning a similar involvement in Laos? The administration, which is in no way responsible for the original Laos commitments, has the duty of telling America just what is going on and what is planned.

WASHINGTON STAR
8 OCT 1969

A BOOK FOR TODAY

Tully Takes a Look at the NSA

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY

THE SUPER SPIES

By Andrew Tully. William Morrow & Co. 256 pages. \$5.95.

With Halloween close upon us, this is as good a time as any for another of Andrew Tully's swoops into the world of the spooks. Having at various times dissected and examined the FBI, the CIA and law enforcement functions of Treasury agents, Tully now turns his attention to the National Security Agency.

What he has here is a book with not one but two subtitles. On the cover it is proclaimed that this is the inside story of "the NSA—America's Biggest, Most Secret, Most Powerful Spy Agency." But on the title page the agency is described as "More Secret, More Powerful Than The CIA."

Well, one shouldn't boggle at a touch of hyperbole. Surely NSA is more secret than CIA and FBI but whether it is more powerful can be questioned, since power is a relative thing. The FBI has the power to arrest car thieves, infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan or shoot it out with bank robbers. The CIA can recommend that uncertain trumpets be terminated with extreme prejudice, as the bureaucratic term put it. CIA also can equip and train invasion forces, maintain little armies of Montagnards who hate all Vietnamese, not just those from north of the DMZ, and do all manner of tricks involving people in its pursuit of intelligence.

Electronics Experts

Stripped of its comparisons with the multiplicity of other

agencies in the cloak-and-dagger business, NSA appears more in the light of a community of experts in electronic gadgetry and the language of codes and ciphers than in the exercise of such dramatics as shadowing, subverting, seducing and surreptitious shenanigans.

Once he has run through a summing up of what America has in the way of spymasters and spy agencies, Tully gets around to telling us what NSA does and how it does it. He puts the NSA budget at twice the \$750 million he estimates the CIA spends each year. Figuring the whole spy empire bill at \$4 billion per annum, clearly NSA is getting the lion's share of Tully's figures are correct.

Is it the biggest of all the clandestine agencies? Possibly, but one can't be sure. NSA is part of the Department of Defense and evidently has more employees than the 14,000 who work for CIA. Even the Defense Intelligence Agency is bigger than CIA and the domestic FBI chugs along with a mere 6,000 agents plus clerical help. In size of plant, NSA leads them all with a \$47 million complex on 82 acres at Fort Meade, Md.

In human terms, it is apt to think of NSA as one does of the technician who supplies James Bond with all the marvels he uses in his mating dances with SMERSH. It is hard to figure what Tully means when he says NSA is the greatest organization of its kind since the Biblical Israelites crossed over into Canaan—perhaps the use of sound as a weapon as against the walls of Jericho.

Be that as it may, it is in the realm of sound, communication, radio waves, telephone transmissions, bugs, et cetera that NSA shines, offensively and defensively. The agency preserves the secrecy of U.S.

code-cipher traffic and spends much of its time listening in on and deciphering the transmissions of other countries, obviously with the greatest emphasis on the U.S.S.R. and Red China.

Hard News

Tully's book, since he is primarily a newsman, is a collection of hard news stories. It tells a lot of things the man in the street would have no occasion to know, lacking total recall of all the news clippings of the past few years, and includes a few exclusives that are likely to remain exclusive.

There are interesting and uncheckable anecdotes. One indicates that the flying saucers are really some sort of surveillance vehicles which operate, according to Tully, in outer space and occasionally crash. Both sides have them, he writes.

But the major question remains unanswered and it is beyond any author's ability to do so. That question is: If President Truman formed the CIA in order to have one clearing house for all intelligence reaching the United States, why does the Department of Defense have a larger and more diverse grouping of sub-agencies doing the same thing CIA does?

In conclusion, a reader might wonder after reading this book whether Tully is pointing with pride or viewing with alarm.

STATINTL

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

STATINTL

M - 237,967
S - 568,577

OCT 4 1969

Green Beret justice?

About the only correctly handled aspect of the Green Beret affair was the decision of the administration, as relayed by the Secretary of the Army, to drop murder charges against the eight men involved.

✓ The alleged assassination of a Vietnamese double-agent is analagous in some ways to the Pueblo incident, in that it concerns the overlapping and often indistinct responsibilities of the military and espionage branches of the defense establishment.

✓ Unlike the Pueblo contretemps, the Special Forces fiasco did not create an international crisis. Here the victims of military mismanagement are strictly the men concerned, their reputations and Army careers probably damaged.

The role, if any, of the Central Intelligence Agency in the killing of the agent is not so important as the extent to which the armed forces of the United States are used as instruments of national intelligence policy.

No matter who ordered the extermination of agent Chuyen, it is reasonable to assume that it was an

established practice to use Special Forces personnel to carry out spy missions, including "termination with extreme prejudice."

It is naive to believe that nations can wage a war, or sustain peace, without the valuable intelligence functions of agencies like the CIA. But what is in question in the Green Beret affair, as it was in the capture of the Pueblo, is whether operations of agencies like the CIA and its overseer, the National Security Agency, should use military personnel for its ventures.

✓ The divided responsibilities of the Special Forces has been known to vex Gen Creighton Abrams, commander in chief in Vietnam, who reasons convincingly that the Green Berets are Army men and as such should be completely under military control.

President Nixon should profit by the lessons of both the Pueblo and Green Beret incidents and establish a policy that will differentiate unequivocally between functions that are properly military, and those that belong to professional spies.

25 March 1969

STATINTL

Deep behind the public hearings on the *Pueblo* seizure a bitter dispute is racking the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. In testifying that the intelligence officer and 38 enlisted men behind the triple lock "were not working for me," Commander Lloyd Bucher has heated to boiling point the Navy's—and her sister services'—accumulated resentments against the free-wheeling intelligence agencies. CIA Director Richard Helms was panicked into an unprecedented sort of public statement: "Neither the CIA, nor I personally, have had anything to do with the mission of the *USS Pueblo*, the ship itself or any of her crew." This seemed to finger the NSA, and got the NSA people, also, furious against Helms. Whether Helms was telling the truth or not, he is the Central Intelligence Director with a general responsibility for *all* intelligence operations. Helms is also, it is not forgotten in high places, a Democratic appointee. The rumor runs that he may soon be tossed to the wolves. ✓

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REMEMBER THE PUEBLO

JACK ROBERTSON

Mr. Robertson is Senior Science Reporter for the Fairchild Publications, specializing in military and space coverage. He covered the hearings in Coronado and is now attending the Congressional inquiry into the Pueblo case.

The two-month Navy Court of Inquiry on the seizure of the *Pueblo* has proved one thing—that the military hierarchy changes very little. The volumes of testimony read much like the hearings on Pearl Harbor, the Tonkin Gulf, the 1968 Tet offensive. If anything, they show that the *Pueblo* mistakes could be repeated tomorrow.

Despite the length of the proceedings, the Navy tribunal managed to avoid any serious look into the military operations surrounding the *Pueblo*. Therefore Congress is not satisfied, and the House Armed Services Special Investigating subcommittee has already opened its own investigation. Chairman Otis Pike (D., N.Y.) says his panel will interrogate Pentagon figures whom the Navy avoided.

The House unit should concern itself with divided authority, intelligence breakdowns and command confusion—all matters that the Navy ignored. First of all, it should dig into the divided command problems of the new Navy. The *Pueblo* was a divided ship. Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher sailed the vessel, but an intelligence officer, Lieut. Stephen Harris, had complete charge of its spy center.

In many ways, the intelligence lieutenant was the most important man on the ship. Bucher got into the spy nerve center of his own ship only when he could prove a definite need to know. When he ordered destruction of security material during the attack, he was amazed to find that cleaning up the classified attic would take half a day. Harris' spy radio was almost the only contact the *Pueblo* had back to its base in Japan. Perhaps it is no accident that she became the first U.S. naval ship to be pirated in 150 years. In the days when a captain was complete master of his ship, the command confusion in the midst of the *Pueblo* attack would have been unthinkable.

In the new Navy, ambiguity of command prevails all the way back to Washington. Commander Bucher's boss, Rear Adm. Frank Johnson, had a similarly divided house at Japan Naval Forces headquarters. Johnson ran the ships, but Naval Intelligence, acting for the National Security Agency (NSA), ran the spy business. Johnson got only a verbal report on the *Pueblo* spy situation before the ship sailed. His sole fleet consisted of the *Pueblo* and a sister spy ship, the *Banner*. He lacked even a PT boat for help in case of trouble.

Back in Washington, NSA ran the spy operations, while the Navy Department tried to be helpful. Task Force 7623 was supposed to coordinate everyone who had a hand in the *Pueblo*, but it didn't. The 58 pages of messages logged in from all the commands during the crisis reveal a disjointed indecision that wasted the hours when the ship might have been saved. Nor is the *Pueblo* unique. An earlier intelligence vessel, the *Liberty*, operated under a similar split authority between NSA and the Navy. During the 1967 Israeli-Arab Six Day War, the *Liberty*, not being part of the Sixth Fleet, was allowed to wander too close to the war front. When the Pentagon belatedly tried to warn the ship to withdraw, the ship was already in NSA headquarters and filed away. The *Liberty* never did

get the warnings. Part of the failure to detect the 1968 Tet attack was traced to intelligence static between U.S. security agencies and the South Vietnamese.

NSA is also the intelligence power behind the throne of the Air Force. The Mission Impossible agency has built five \$100 million ground-based spying antenna stations around the world. The Air Force runs them, even relays intelligence data through them from its satellites and spy planes, but NSA pulls the strings.

Congress will also ask why it was hours before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense were alerted in the *Pueblo* crisis. The ship sent its first alert at 10:50 A.M. Korean time, January 23. It flashed the North Korean threat to open fire an hour later. That was 10 P.M. Washington time, but the Joint Chiefs were not notified until midnight; Defense Secretary McNamara was not informed until 12:23 A.M. By then, the *Pueblo* had been boarded and was on its way to captivity.

All *Pueblo* wires were addressed to the Joint Chiefs. Its warnings and calls for help should have been relayed to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon within seconds. Commander Bucher said his "critical" priority wires went directly to the White House also—and this was so, since the Executive mansion is tied to the Pentagon war room. No one has explained why the frantic *Pueblo* SOS took two hours to reach the top commands.

If the Pentagon brass was not around when the *Pueblo* was attacked, neither was Rear Admiral Johnson, the man immediately responsible for rescuing the ship. At that moment, he was delivering a welcoming address to the annual Navy Typhoon conference in Tokyo. He was called to the phone and told in veiled terms, "The *Pueblo* is in trouble. She may be gone." Johnson had trouble rounding up transportation back to his command. He finally commandeered an Army helicopter, got home at 3:10 P.M. local time, when the *Pueblo* was already in Communist hands. His staff had requested help from the Air Force, but not the Seventh Fleet. His juniors told him that the Navy had nothing to send.

But the Seventh Fleet did have help less than an hour's flying time from the *Pueblo*. The carrier *Enterprise* was steaming 600 miles away, bound for Vietnam. Its pilots were primed on Vietnamese targets. The Navy said it would have taken hours to brief them on the uncertain *Pueblo* crisis. Four hours after getting the *Pueblo*'s "Mayday," the Seventh Fleet finally decided to send two destroyers to its aid. By then, the *Pueblo* was being escorted into Wonsan. The destroyers would have had to blast their way into the port to effect a rescue, and Washington had no heart for risking a second Asian war. It ordered the destroyers back.

The command confusion was so bad that no one bothered to radio any communiqué to the *Pueblo*. Nowhere in the 58 pages of communications is there a single official message to the beleaguered ship. In all likelihood, there was nothing to send. Bucher told how it felt to be left to fend for his ship with only two frozen-shut machine guns: he beat the bulkhead with his fists after leaving the ship's message-less radio room.

The only word the *Pueblo* got from Japan was an erroneous report that the ship had been captured. The radio operator:

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continued

Pueblo Still Puzzle Despite the Probes

By ROBERT WALTERS
Star Staff Writer

It is one of the particular ironies of the saga of the USS Pueblo that so little substantive information has yet been disclosed despite the several "public" investigations being conducted into the vessel's capture and the attention the topic has received.

A Navy Court of Inquiry has been meeting for almost two months in Coronado, Calif., to receive testimony in the case. A special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee has held a second week of hearings. And the Senate Armed Services Committee has plans for a similar inquiry.

Cmdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, captain of the intelligence gathering ship, and his crew of 83 have been the subject of numerous magazine cover stories, a far greater number of well-displayed newspaper accounts and a cumulative total of hundreds of hours of radio and television news time.

Pundits, both amateur and professional, have declared the case to be an important one because it will resolve, they hope, many of the important philosophic, diplomatic and military questions of the troubled times.

Among them: Is the Navy tradition of "don't give up the ship" — what you're classifying and for regardless of how many lives are at stake — still applicable?

Should this country's armed forces receive more sophisticated training to cope with the "grey word" area" situations they encounter with increasing frequency while fighting undeclared wars and gaging in intelligence missions against unofficial enemies?

Should the Code of Conduct, governing the behavior of United States military men captured by hostile troops, be drastically revised to enable our forces to better handle themselves when faced with "brainwashing" and other sophisticated psychological techniques for extorting "confessions?"

Another Question

To that list, there should perhaps be added another question: Does the Defense Department rely too heavily on "security for security's sake," either because of its unaltered habits or to avoid embarrassing disclosures?

Item—Navy regulations call for a Court of Inquiry to meet in open session unless there are "security reasons or other good cause" for closed hearings. The Coronado investigation has been conducted behind closed doors almost as often as it has been open to the press and public.

Item — The House subcommittee opened its hearings March 4 with a promise from the chairman that testimony, "to the utmost extent possible, will be heard in open session." Since then, it has held one public hearing followed by six closed sessions.

Item — The Navy is so security-conscious about the issue that it reportedly has classified even the biographies of some of the witnesses to appear before those executive sessions of the House subcommittee.

One of the principal difficulties in challenging such security arrangements from the outside is that the layman is confronted with a chicken-and-egg dilemma which goes something like this:

Q. Why won't you tell the public more about what's going on behind those closed doors?

A. Because the material is classified, and disclosure would compromise the national security.

Q. Well, we question whether the public doesn't have a right to know what those closed doors are at.

A. Sorry, we can't talk about that because it would involve a breach of security. You have to accept our word that it's classified for good reasons.

Nevertheless, some disconcerting information has leaked out about the "classified" aspects of the Pueblo case which provide grounds to at least openly challenge the procedures the Defense Department is relying upon.

For example, it has become a widely accepted item of faith among reporters who covered the Coronado hearings that the National Security Agency (NSA) played a major role in the mission and operations of the Pueblo. But NSA's part in the operation never has been fully discussed in public either in California or in Washington.

"If it's ever made public, the Pueblo could become NSA's Bay of Pigs," said one Navy officer, alluding to the abortive invasion of Cuba in the early 1960s which still haunts the NSA's reputation.

With the exception of some messy personnel scandals in the early 1960s, the NSA has managed to stay well hidden from public scrutiny. While the CIA has suffered public embarrassment numerous times in recent years, the NSA has guarded its mandate for secrecy and avoided such humiliation.

For example, almost any tourist can identify the location of the CIA's once "secret headquarters" (Langley, Va.) but few can name the site of NSA's headquarters (Fort George G. Meade, Md., halfway between Washington and Baltimore).

Similarly, Richard Helms, the CIA's director, is a well-known figure among Washington's bureaucrat-watchers, but how many people have heard of Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the NSA's director?

To be sure, "disclosure for disclosure's sake" has no more justification that "security for security's sake," but there is good reason to believe that the NSA shares with the Navy the principal responsibility for the Pueblo's mission and operations, and owes the public some explanation for its role in the fateful voyage.

There are other questions to be raised in the area of security.

The North Koreans captured, along with the Pueblo, a goodly part of the estimated 600 pounds of classified documents the ship was carrying, according to a Navy intelligence expert who testified before the Court of Inquiry. (He initially estimated the total to be 2,000 pounds, then revised his figure—during a secret session.)

Defense Order

As soon as the Defense Department heard that the Pueblo had seized and some of the documents compromised, it ordered the abandonment of all of the materials involved. The captain of the Pueblo's sister intelligence ship, the USS Banner, testified that he spent three days burning classified documents assigned to his vessel.

Thus, the material is no longer in use, and at least some of it is in enemy hands — but the Pentagon has steadfastly refused to disclose any details of what was contained in the documents. Its argument is that the North Koreans may not understand the full meaning of the material they captured.

Testimony offered by the Pueblo crew indicated that the North Koreans

were not particularly bright, but Navy officials privately acknowledge that both Soviet and Chinese Communist intelligence experts probably have demanded a chance to look at the documents — and they are savvy enough to understand what they examine.

The Defense Department has released one document, the Pueblo's "sailing order," which discloses only that the ship was to conduct "operations" off the North Korean coast and "surveillance" of Soviet ships in the Nasima Straits.

In addition, the document shows that the code name of the operation was inexplicably changed from "Pinkroot One" to the difficult-to-pronounce "Iethyic One." Further, it contains this paragraph of particular interest:

"Provisions of Reference C apply regarding rules of engagement. Reference D applies regarding conduct in the event of harassment or intimidation by foreign units."

Much of the public debate surrounding the Pueblo's capture centers around the question of whether Bucher acted properly when confronted by exactly those situations.

But when members of the House subcommittee asked to examine References C and D during their only public hearing, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the chief of naval operations, said they were classified and could be presented only in executive session.

In addition to repeatedly involving security, Moorer told the subcommittee that "it would inappropriate and premature for me to express opinions" about any area which the court of inquiry had in its purview.

He declined to answer several questions on the grounds that he was in the chain of command which must review the court's recommendations before they are made public, and did not want to be in the position of "influencing or appearing to influence or interfere" with the court's deliberations.

Rep. Otis G. Pike, D-N.Y., the subcommittee's chairman, opened the hearing by explaining that he hoped for the maximum use of public sessions. "We anticipate objections to this on several grounds," he said, then added:

"We are not, however, going to accept the argument of national security as a reason for holding closed sessions when the subject matter is clearly known to our adversaries and when the apparent reason for the request is not to protect national security but to protect individuals or groups from embarrassment."

13 Unreplied

Pike then disclosed that of 29 questions submitted in writing to

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E - 671,525
S - 728,276

MAR 3 1969



Henry J. Taylor

British intelligence forced to reorganize

Washington—President Nixon's security group was informed in England that unrevealed circumstances have forced Prime Minister Harold Wilson to order a sweeping reorganization of British intelligence.

This is important to us, for the link with the U. S. in this problem is dangerous.

British traitor Harold A. R. (Kim) Philby was a Soviet spy for 30 years. Interviewed in Moscow on November 14, 1967, by the London Daily Express, he was asked how he got to the top of British intelligence. His answer reveals a great deal. "I just arranged things so that I was invited," Philby said.

He became head of the American Department in London May 1, 1950. He continued as a Soviet agent for 14 years after—as the "third man"—he tipped off co-conspirators Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. They fled together from Washington to London to Moscow.

U.S. plans accessible

Philby's top-level rank in British intelligence gave him access to all secret United States plans and policies involving British interests. His wife (uninvolved in his spying) was from Seattle. Completely at home in our country, he was revealing every plan to the Kremlin.

The senior Soviet KGB espionage officer, known as Maj. Gen. Anatoli Dolnytsin, exposed Philby when Dolnytsin defected to the West, but the British Government actually whitewashed him until Philby himself demolished the whitewash by fleeing to Moscow.

Meanwhile, the Konon Molody spy ring, which the KGB planted in the British Admiralty under Moscow agent "Gordon Lonsdale," went undetected for 12 years in its successive steps and obtained, among innumerable other U.S. top secrets, our atomic submarine secrets at the British naval base at Scapa Flow.

British apparatus

The British intelligence service is nearly 400 years old. It was organized in 1573. It began then with 53 agents planted in the courts of foreign monarchs. And most of its top echelon has always come from public-school England—Oxford and Cambridge.

The British apparatus is large, but only a fraction the size of our Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA's current budget (secret) is around \$1½ billion a year, according to the House Armed Services Committee. The CIA alone, with 10,000 people in its Langley, Va., headquarters and at least another 5,000 scattered throughout the world burrowing for intelligence, spends more than twice as much money as the entire State Department.

Costs in Britain

Also, hardly known to our public but actually rivalling the CIA in size, there is the hush-hush National Security Agency—the immense and sprawling group that, among other things, operated the Pueblo. And a dozen other intelligence groups do not complete the full assortment.

Britain spends an estimated \$300 million a year among its intelligence branches. The section called MI-6 operates agents overseas. The Foreign Office Intelligence Unit is a part of MI-6. MI-5 protects home security in the manner of our FBI. This contains the so-called Special Section of Scotland Yard which is, in effect, a third branch. A fourth—the Defense Ministry's C-SICH (Combined Services Information Clearing House)—sorts, files and distributes all British and Commonwealth intelligence matter and the intake from world-wide British commercial companies. These furnish a large volume of British intelligence.

Beyond these, an apparatus called Central Register, run by MI-5, collects dossiers on about 2 million people, including foreigners.

Root of trouble

The inbred nature of Britain's secret services has been one root of the trouble—notoriously so. In espionage, it is good intelligence to think the unthinkable. But, as in the Philby, Maclean and Burgess cases, British Government leadership repeatedly refused to believe that others out of the same top drawer could be traitors to England.

The most important spies in any country are nationals of that country. An espionage apparatus cannot be built on any other basis. Traitorism is an international curse—as positively in our country as elsewhere—and the British have been alarmingly unwilling to fully recognize this inevitable danger.

WASHINGTON
23 FEB 1969

— IN CAPITAL CORRIDORS —

Woes of a Long-Distance Runner

There's a veteran civil servant who works on the overt side of CIA and his business frequently takes him to the super-security conscious National Security Agency at Ft. Meade, Md. He is also a dedicated jogger.

Being methodical by nature, the man keeps elaborate records of his jogging — distance jogged, time elapsed, pulse rate, caloric intake, etc. He keeps the records in his briefcase for periodic scrutiny.

The other day he went to NSA, got in with his ID card but had to open his briefcase for the Marine guard when he was leaving the installation. Out came the cryptic numerals recording his daily jogging performance.

The Marine was highly suspicious until the numbers were explained to him. It turned out the Marine is a jogger with a considerably better performance record than the fortyish CIA man.

With the slight smile 20-year-olds reserve for the middle-aged, the Marine permitted the CIA man to go his way.

The CIA in Trouble over *Pueblo*

The *Pueblo* inquiry has sparked off an acrimonious dispute — conducted in appropriate secrecy — between a group of American service chiefs, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency (about which the general public knows even less than it does about the CIA). There is even speculation that because of the *Pueblo* episode the head of the CIA, Mr Richard Helms, is in danger of losing his top-secret job — even though President Nixon had invited him to stay on. His position is intrinsically vulnerable because he was a Democratic Administration appointee.

Under heavy fire from both military and political critics, Mr Helms recently took the rare step of issuing a statement in self-defence. 'Neither the CIA, nor I personally', Mr Helms declared, 'have had anything to do with the mission of the *USS Pueblo*, the ship itself or any of her crew'. This disclaimer, unfortunately, only brought more criticism on his head; for some observers interpreted it as an attempt by Mr Helms to pass the buck to the NSA.

This has scarcely endeared him to members of that agency — especially as it may well have been the NSA, and not the CIA, which initiated the *Pueblo* operation. The complicating factor is that Mr Helms also bears the designation of Director, Central Intelligence, which means that he bears overall responsibility for all intelligence operations, just as the late Mr Allen Dulles did.

Needless to say, Mr Helms is in trouble with the navy. Whatever the navy's chiefs may think of Commander Lloyd Bucher's actions — and opinion in the navy as elsewhere is inevitably divided — his disclosure that 'these people were not working for me' has aroused deep apprehension and bitter resentment throughout the service. ('These people' were the intelligence officer and 38 enlisted men who worked on the *Pueblo* behind a triple-locked door which the commander himself required special permission to pass).

The commander therefore was not in complete command of his own ship. Yet Commander Bucher has been warned that he may be court-martialled for violating Article 0730 of navy regulations, which says: 'The commanding officer shall not permit his command to be searched by any person representing a foreign state nor permit any of the personnel under his command to be removed from the command by such person, so long as he has the power to resist'.

But it is not merely the naval chiefs who are indignant. Their anger is shared by many senior army and air force officers, some of whom are influential with Congress. They want the whole affair fully investigated. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Mendel Rivers, has already been persuaded to conduct an inquiry into it; but the military malcontents are hoping to prevail on Senator Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to interest himself in the affair. The odds are that he will; in which case a hard time awaits Mr Helms, the CIA and the NSA. Senator Fulbright has often been anti-military; but more often he has been anti-CIA.

The fact is that all three of the services have long-standing grudges against the intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, and the *Pueblo* affair may merely bring matters to a head.

In spite of all its panoply of power the Defence Department (which has its own intelligence section) has often found itself playing the role of supplier — both of men and weapons — to the CIA, to enable the agency to conduct clandestine operations abroad. The State Department (which also has an intelligence unit) has similarly been under frequent levy by the agency. (Mr Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, once remarked ruefully at a Congressional hearing that in some American embassies the personnel consisted mainly of people of 'other agencies'; everyone knew whom he was referring to.)

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\$6 Billion of Defense Budget Is Shrouded in Deep Secrecy

By EDWARD J. MICHELSON
WASHINGTON (NANA) — In the new defense budget for the year starting July 1 there is a \$6 billion item — "for intelligence and communications."

There is no elaboration, even though the figure represents about 13 per cent of a total Pentagon outlay in fiscal 1969 of \$80 billion.

Only Few Know

In Congress, only a handful of legislators know the breakdown in broad terms. But it's taken for granted the \$6 billion plus other funds allocated for defense, is shared among the various units of the "intelligence community," including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

And at least \$2 billion of the total is believed to go to the most secretive of these units,

the National Security Agency (NSA).

This is one reason why the Korean crisis involving the 179-foot Pueblo, a converted freighter, built during World War II, and rated too small and too slow even for sealifting military cargo to Vietnam, commands the limelight.

The Pueblo is called a Naval Auxiliary, but it is part of a fleet of electronic intelligence ("Elint") ships controlled by NSA. The fleet is, in turn, part of a worldwide intelligence network intercepting radar and radio signals and emanations on which U. S. survival as the world's foremost superpower depends.

The network includes land and airborne "stations" equipped with electronic gear which can instantaneously alert headquarters in the Washington,

area of the offensive and defensive capabilities of any nation in a given area of the world.

Moreover, the intelligence gathered in an area covers the whole spectrum of electromagnetic emanations. And this information can be used by U. S. experts in military electronics to "jam" or deceive the search and reconnaissance radars of a potential enemy.

Capabilities Known

The capabilities of the electronic equipment used on the Pueblo and other units of the NSA — controlled naval auxiliaries are known in the U. S. to many thousands of electronics industry workers.

Moreover the size of the NSA forces is hard to conceal. Approximately 17,000 Defense Department personnel, civilian and military, work in the Washington - Baltimore area,

chiefly at NSA headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., within commuting distance of the national capital.

The NSA's intelligence gathering operations to track missile shots, record atomic tests and intercept a vast range of long-distance communications were highlighted last June when the USS Liberty, a much larger sister ship of the Pueblo, was badly damaged off the Sinai Peninsula in an Israeli air and sea attack in which 34 of the Liberty's complement of 125 were killed. The Liberty was deactivated this month at Norfolk, Va., headquarters of the U. S. and the NATO Atlantic fleet, and is probably headed for the scrap heap.

Another "Elint" ship of the Liberty's size (7000 tons) the Georgetown, was buzzed in the

Eastern Mediterranean Feb. 11 by Egyptian bomber pilots flying Russian-built Ilyushin-28 jets.

The Georgetown was 50 miles offshore, north of Alexandria, when the buzzing occurred.

Sticky Situation

The NSA is in a sticky situation even though the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Arkansas' J. William Fulbright, is demanding answers from the State Department about the persons responsible for "Elint" operations. Sen. Fulbright's four-page questionnaire could bring to the surface the resentment of high-ranking Navy officials over the "defenselessness" of the Pueblo and other "ferret" vessels.

The Navy hasn't had control of such ships since 1962, when the Kennedy administration created the existing

arrangement. The NSA is headed by a general or an admiral and has a large number of armed forces officers.

Even though the Foreign Relations Committee will be denied answers to many of the specific Fulbright questions, on security grounds, the administration is being harassed, in maintaining silence, while trying to recover the ship and the crew from the North Koreans.

Details of the events leading up to the boarding the ship and the ensuing death of one of the crew members have been widely circulated, with "no comment" from the Pentagon.

At the same time the Congressional Record abounds in details about the Soviet "spy" fleet, many of the ships operating in the guise of trawlers. Sen. Robert T. Griffin, R-Mich., is among the legislators who have inserted statements as to the size, speed and communications gear, when the ships are deployed,

in the North, Baltic, Black Seas, the Pacific, and along the U. S. east and west coasts.

Russian Spying

The Russians have surveyed the American Naval Base at Rota, Spain, the Polaris submarine base at Holy Loch, Scotland and installations on Guam, according to Sen. Griffin.

Aside from highlighting outlays for "intelligence and communications" at a time when the Pentagon is experiencing "budget stringency" affecting research and programs, the Pueblo has also underscored the limits to U. S. capabilities as a military superpower.

"Hawkish" critics have repeatedly cited the shortage of combat troops, pilots, M-16 rifles and other equipment that has necessitated the shift of soldiers, tanks, artillery, helicopters and aircraft from other parts of the world — including Korea. In effect, the U. S. is held to be incapable of fighting more than one war at a time.

It is also held that the fighter and bomber planes in South Korea for such emergencies as the Pueblo incident were equipped for the Eisenhower era policy of "massive" nuclear retaliation rather than the conventional warfare "flexibility" marking Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's management starting seven years ago.

Defenders of NSA and other "intelligence community" agencies are expected to show that the "Elints" were engaged in determining whether a North Korean invasion of the south was being organized and to patrol sea lanes between Vladivostok and Haiphong, used by the Soviets to supply North Vietnam and to harass U. S. fleet movements in far eastern waters.

The

CODEBREAKERS

computer spies:

By David Kahn

David Kahn is the author of the book, "The Codebreakers."

IT IS the largest intelligence organization in the free world — bigger even than the Central Intelligence agency. It produces more information than spies. And it is the most hush-hush organization in Washington.

It is the National Security agency, the American codemaking and codebreaking outfit. It stands, innocently enough, exposed to the eyes of anyone driving along the Baltimore-Washington expressway. But its two modern, steel and glass buildings are surrounded by a triple fence, guarded by United States marines, and entered only thru gatehouses where warning devices buzz ominously.

For inside, men are engaging in some of the most secret and sensitive work in the intelligence community: the breaking of the

coded messages of foreign governments. Gibberish plucked from the ether by the 2,000 posts of NSA's worldwide intercepting net pours in on four-ply paper. Mathematicians scrutinize these cryptograms for chinks in their armor, then batter them with all the tools of cryptanalytic science.

In other sections of NSA, statisticians plot the routing and volume of Chinese military messages to build up a picture of the army command structure. Linguists analyze the chatter of Soviet air force pilots to learn the names of units and commanders; details of new equipment, the state of morale.

Because of the volume and value of the information that flows in modern communications channels, codebreaking is the most

important form of secret intelligence in the world today. It is true that a Klaus Fuchs may steal a single secret more valuable than any one message. But not even a whole troop of James Bonds can turn out, day after day, information as detailed, as accurate, and as up-to-date as the interception and solution of hundreds of secret messages.

That is why NSA is bigger than the CIA, NSA's headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., with 1,900,000 square feet of office space, is half again as big as CIA's headquarters at Langley, Va., with 1,135,000 square feet. NSA has been estimated to employ 14,000 persons in the Washington area, compared to CIA's 10,000. Its budget has been estimated to be

twice that of CIA's 500 million dollars — tho the NSA figure must include the cost of launching satellites that eavesdrop not only on Soviet missile countdowns but also on the microwave circuits of Russian long-distance telephone calls.

The money is well spent if codebreaking is doing as much in the present as it has in the past. The breaking of messages of Mary, Queen of Scots, disclosed her plotting to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I and usurp the throne of England — a disclosure that sent her to the executioner. The solution of an Italian cryptogram helped exonerate Alfred Dreyfus, the man of Devil's Island, in France's turn-of-the-century *cause celebre*.

In 1917, Britain peeled back the layer of Code 0075 that enshrouded a message of Arthur Zimmermann, the German foreign minister, and discovered him urging Mexico to ally itself with Germany in warring upon the United States. With victory, Zimmermann promised, Mexico would recover the territories she had lost in 1848 — Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Britain gave the solution to President Woodrow Wilson, who made it public. America exploded in outrage. A month later, Congress declared war.

Cryptanalysis turned the tide of World War II in the Pacific. Early in 1942, codebreakers of

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Superspies Are Human Too

By YORKE HENDERSON
LONDON, Feb. 10—By an uncomfortable coincidence the Pueblo affair virtually coincided with the publication in Britain of the new novel "Report From the Iron Mountain."

Uncomfortable, for it reinforced the unacknowledged suspicion held by many on this side of the Atlantic that there exists in America some sort of supra-presidential ruling body; a nucleus of Doctor Strangeloves.

THE SEEDS of suspicion were sown with the embarrassing disclosure of presidential ignorance at the time of the U-2 incident. Suddenly the imaginings of thriller-writers seemed ominously less remote and the existence of the gray apocalypse-makers just that much more credible.

Among continental Europeans a similar mystique used to surround British intelligence. Its chiefs were believed to be emotionless superbeings above the laws of God and men, manipulating international statesmen and able to dole out death, any place, any time.

The American version was infinitely more frightening. These were the Armageddon men, dealing not in the fate of nations, but of the world. The

masters strategists of the last battle.

The Central Intelligence Agency was taken to be the tip of the iceberg. Its ramifications were limitless and — as the U-2 business seemed to confirm — knowledge of its workings denied even to the President of the United States.

NOW COMES the Pueblo incident and again the charge that the President was not privy to the policy which directed the ship; even that he did not know until too late that the Enterprise had been ordered out to show the flag.

This time, though, we are told that the Pueblo was a tool of the National Security Agency, an organization beside which the CIA are Boy Scouts.

Not unnaturally a generation condition by Ian Fleming and Len Deighton is left wondering what other agencies there are beside which the NSA are Boy Scouts; and after that, what? Like one of those Chinese carvings inside carvings ad infinitum.

Privately there lurks the belief that in "Report From the Iron Mountain" we are being permitted a glimpse of the ultimate men, the very kernel of the Chinese carving. And the terrifying thing is that they are not power-mad megalomaniacs or any of the conventional

master-minds, but absolutely, impeccably, one hundred per cent objective men.

WHAT A LOAD of old codswallop!

Intelligence agencies have been embarrassing their bosses since Old Testament times. The Spanish armada was precipitated because the Elizabethan equivalent of the CIA or the NSA deemed it advisable to have Mary Queen of Scots knocked off without letting Good Queen Bess about it.

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JAN 28 1968

N. Korea Broke a Non-Rule

STATINT

By John Maffre

Washington Post Staff Writer

THE COUNTRY whose spies get caught off base usually has no option but to adopt a posture of pained silence, like the man with a hangover. He cannot cure his problem; he can only outlive it.

But last week the non-rules that hover around the art of spying, or gathering intelligence, were badly shaken when the North Koreans forced the USS Pueblo into their port of Wonsan.

No one was off base. By all accounts the Navy was snooping without trespassing on North Korea's sea or air or land space. It was not hurting the North Koreans or threatening them; it is highly unlikely that it was interfering with their communications because its job was to listen, not to obstruct.

Navy ships have done that off North Korea for years the way Russian trawlers and naval auxiliaries are doing it today off both coasts of the United States, an irritating presence but part of a warfare that is measurable only on a political thermometer. The two big powers have agreed tacitly to keep it that way. It is hardly a gentlemen's agreement, considering the nature of the activity that's involved, but it is certainly a working arrangement.

Now the North Koreans have upset the non-rules that the big powers lived with, for reasons best known to themselves (or to Peking—or even Moscow).

Certainly this will bring about an urgent reappraisal of spy methods, not only by the United States but by every country engaged in spying.

The Naked Mighty

THE FACT is that the United States cannot bear to be without a sensitive, costly and indefatigable spy apparatus. Neither can Russia, France, Britain, West Germany or Israel. Neither can any country that is large enough to be reckoned as a major ally or enemy, large enough to feel naked unless it is reasonably well informed on what its big neighbors are up to.

Yet for all its vital importance, spying has one major and insuperable limitation. It can put together an amazing dossier on what the most secretive hostile power has in hand, but it can make only an educated guess—and perhaps a disastrously wrong one—at what the enemy intends to do with it.

Sometimes the powers get caught at it.

In the summer of 1960 an RB47 jet reconnaissance plane probed into the Barents Sea far north of Moscow and was shot down. Months later, President Kennedy's persuasion was needed to get the two officers released. The plane was apparently on a mission that could be called, a faint, to smoke out the detection capability the Russians had going for them on the cold roof of the world. The fliers found out.

That year, too, the CIA got caught off base. Its U-2 plane flown by Gary Powers was picked off high over Russia by a SAM (surface-to-air missile) that people didn't think was all that accurate at such a height. It was.

The U-2 affair points up why the non-rules of the spying business hardly permit it to be called a gentlemen's agreement. The plane had been produced by Lockheed for the CIA in the mid-1950s and by 1956 it had made passes over Russia. The Russians knew about it. They couldn't do anything at the time because they lacked the technical means, but they were very annoyed and they protested privately in Washington.

Washington made some polite noises and perhaps the U-2 flights were held off for a while, but they were resumed.

There may have been 20 or 30 or more sometimes from Turkey, sometimes

on Spying

from Norway, and on some occasions the slower and lower Migs of the day scrambled in vain to catch the high intruder. Finally that SAM either nicked it or came close enough to cause a flameout.

American military snooping is technically elaborate and highly professional but, despite the best efforts of retiring Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, not entirely coordinated. It was he who established the Defense Intelligence Agency to bring about more cohesion and to cut down the interservice rivalry that has always

been the curse of the military departments.

One technical expert who is occasionally summoned to work with DIA or one of its members remarked sadly that the services "infiltrated" their best men into DIA and that too many of them regard their own service as their primary interest, and perpetuate the rivalry.

A Super Snooper

BY ITS OWN CHOICE, the Central Intelligence Agency works no closer with the Defense apparatus than duty requires. The CIA also cherishes its separateness from the even more secretive National Security Agency, the vast code-breaking and analyzing plant completed ten years ago out at Ft. Meade, Md. The NSA is nominally under the Defense Secretary and its top slot is always held by an admiral or a general, but it generally operates according to rules known only to itself.

Unlike the CIA, a widely dispersed field agency which casts a broad net for all kinds of political, scientific and economic as well as military information, the various Defense establishments have a narrower scope.

The Army, through its Army Security Agency, naturally operates from more fixed positions than the other two services. As far as ASA's role in eavesdropping is concerned, its fixed

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installations allow it to mount enormously powerful radio and radar equipment that can scan a good 100 miles into an otherwise closed country, and the Army has some highly complex bases in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Taiwan as well as in continental Europe.

Host countries like Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey are very sensitive about such installations on their soil. Some of them allow so few foreign personnel in, particularly military men, that it's a problem keeping the plants operating round the clock.

The navy has always — at least until last week — enjoyed a particular advantage. It could slip up close to a country that was being observed without breaking international law, and sit there for almost indefinite periods, listening in on traffic, locating radar sites and gathering information that would permit their jamming. But in military terms, jamming is an ace to be used sparingly, because it immediately indicates to the other side that something big is in the wind, like shooting.

There are supposed to be about a dozen intelligence-type ships like the Pueblo in the Navy, and perhaps a slightly larger number of oceanographic vessels with an intelligence capa-

bility. Moreover, the combat vessels of the Navy have wide varieties of snooping capability.

Last year the unfortunate USS Liberty sailed too close to the Arab-Israeli war and got badly shot up by Israeli jets, losing 34 men killed and at least 75 wounded. The curious thing about the Liberty incident is that the Joint Chiefs had become worried that she was sailing too close to the combat zone and sent a message ordering her to move away, but somehow the message was not received.

At least the Pentagon has emerged to some extent from its age of innocence in that it has acknowledged what ships like the Pueblo are up to. One naval spokesman observed that "intelligence collection by naval vessels is a routine activity among major powers." That's a great advance over the laughable cover story first put out about the Liberty: that she was meandering around those waters using the moon as a passive reflector in communications. Or the first one in 1960 about the U-2, that it was a NASA weather plane that had unaccountably gone astray.

On the other side of the fence, the Russians have shown an energy and ingenuity in maritime snooping that no other nation can match. In fact, U.S. Navy experts con-

stantly remind Congress — the march the Soviets are leading — the Western navies.

There are reports, for example, that at least half a dozen Soviet electronic spy ships are prowling up and down the U.S. East Coast. They are supposed to be part of a force of over 40 such vessels, a number of them in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic.

There are also literally hundreds of superbly equipped trawlers roaming the oceans. They catch a lot of fish and process them on the high seas with packing and refrigerating equipment that is the envy of other nations. But they also funnel back to Moscow a mosaic of maritime information, not all of it strictly military but including esoteric oceanographic data about the seas around Western countries.

The purely snooping ships are called AGI, or Auxiliary General Intelligence. They can be up to 200 feet long and equipped with the most up to date radio and radar equipment. Sometimes these ships sail right in between American and other NATO country ships in maneuvers in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, coming so close that they are a hazard. Some years ago, a Soviet trawler moved in to photograph the submarine George Washington 60 miles north of Long Island, when it was firing dummy Polaris missiles, and almost collided with a Navy tug.

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The Observer